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TH. RIBOT AND MODERN PSYCHOLOGY*
BV EDWARD SOKAL.
"Thirty years ago, the assertion that psycholog}'
"was yet in its childhood, and had little prospect of
"growing out of it, would have been scouted as
"paradoxical, and a criticism of this kind would have
"been deemed amply refuted by a reference to the
"numerous treatises which have appeared since Locke's
"time on all the various activities of the human mind.
"But to-day this assertion is not at all paradoxical.
"Our point of view has become a different one, and al-
" though we justly acknowledge that the old psycholo-
" gists have rendered great services in many directions,
"have definitively settled many mooted points, and
"have exhibited in their analyses remarkable pene-
"tration and acumen, yet we can now regard their
"work as scarcely anything more than attempts.
"The new spirit of the natural sciences has also
"penetrated psychology. And the question is asked
"whether a mass of acute remarks, fine analyses, ele-
"gantly presented observations on the normal state
"of the mind, and metaphysical hypotheses presented
" as truths, form an articulated system, a true science,
"and whether we should not justly resort to some
" more exact method.
" In this manner a separation has been effected be-
" tween the new and the old psychology which has
"dail}' grown more distinct, and although to all ap-
"pearance the old psychology is still vigorous and
"active, its days are numbered. In the new environ-
" ment which has arisen about it, its conditions of exist-
" ence are different ; its methods are not adequate to
" the constantly increasing difficulties of its problems,
"and to the constantly growing demands of the scien-
" tific spirit : it still lives on its past. In vain do its
"foremost representatives proclaim that we should in-
"vestigate the facts, and should give due attention to
"experience; sincere as their concessions are, they
" produce nothing, and in the actual work are not ful-
" filled. The moment they put their hands to the task
"the irresistible desire for pure speculation takes pos-
" session of them. Furthermore, any condition of
"things which is radically wrong does not admit of
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"reformation, and the old psychology must perish as
"the consequence of its self-contradictory character.
"No endeavors to adapt it to the demands of the times
"can deceive us in this matter ; its fundamental char-
" acter, as may be shown in very few words, always
"remains the same. It is permeated with the meta-
" physical spirit, it is the 'science of the soul'; self-
" observation, analysis, inference, are its favorite
" methods
; it mistrusts the biological sciences, accepts
" their help only unwillingly and when forced to do so,
"and is ashamed of the help which it receives from
"them. Peevish and morose like all that is old and
"weak, it yearns only for seclusion and quiet."
In these words, Th. Armand Ribot summarised, in
the year 1879, the situation of the speculative school in
psychology, and presents in sharp and rigid contrast
thereto the programme of his own scientific activity.
The abyss of ph3'sico-philosophical doubt which the
speculative era opened up had never been bridged by the
speculative philosophj', and its solutions were wofully
disproportionate to the comprehensive scope of the
problems proposed. In company with the band of great
scientific discoverers who were sent forth from the
laboratory of Johannes Miiller, Th. Ribot holds that all
compromise with the nature-philosophy of the past
decades is impossible, and all struggle with them
practically purposeless : there can be no discussion
with representatives of such thought, for neither prin-
ciples nor methods, neither language nor purposes, are
the same. But while men like Helmholtz and Du
Bois-Reymond, whose talents were especially adapted
to observation and experiment, unceasingly promoted
the new method by great discoveries, Ribot, who is
fundamentally a dialectician and who was educated in
the school of abstract philosophical thought, arrived
at the new view of things only with great labor and at
a subsequent period.
It will not, therefore, be surprising, if early and
natural habits of thought did not adapt themselves in
ever}' respect to the changed point of view. Despite
his great and sincere admiration for the experimental
method, we cannot find in a single work of Ribot's a
description of even one experiment which he has in-
dependently conducted. In the method which is pe-
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culiarly his, of sounding a problem on all sides before
actually attacking it, he proves himself a master of
analysis ; the art which he possesses and handles with
a skill amounting to virtuosity, of revealing and thor-
oughly illuminating unclear ideas, may be accepted as
a model of dialectical skill. In a word, he has placed
the intellectual qualities of a past epoch in the service
of modern science, and we shall now show by a brief
discussion of his works how fruitful this union has
been.
The first works of Th. Ribot are of a critical-his-
torical character. Mindful of the saying that the his-
tory of a science is the science itself, he attempts, in
two detailed monographs on English and German
experimental psychology, to tell us the brief past of
this "science of the future." The slow march, the
devious and winding paths which psychology has fol-
lowed, appear to him, from a psychological point of
view, easily intelligible, for he bitterly laments that
one should really be mathematician, physicist, physi-
ologist, and pathologist, and should have a perfect
command of the results and especially of the methods
of all the experimental sciences in order to take up
with any prospect of success psychological investiga-
tions. If, therefore, the results of psychological in-
quiry have not as yet been very great, this, in his
opinion, speaks neither against its methods, nor against
its representatives ; the progress of scientific knowl-
edge is in a much higher degree than we ordinarily
imagine, a function of the time.
In his "English Psychology of To-day," which
appeared in 1870, Ribot discusses in some detail the
works of the two Mills, of Herbert Spencer, Alexander
Bain, and George Lewes, who were at that time al-
most unknown in France. This book, which within a
few years was translated into most of the civilised lan-
guages of Europe, contributed so much to the circula-
tion of these authors, that it was by this fact almost
rendered superfluous. In a brilliant and fascinating
manner it depicts to us the history, method, and aims
of the English psychology, it emphasises with especial
force the predilection of the same for general systems,
its predominantly descriptive character, but it also ex-
pressly mentions its lack of really experimental foun-
dations and the hypothetical features of the majority
of its assumptions. Especially remarkable in our opin-
ion is the essay on Herbert Spencer, as whose enthu-
siastic admirer and adherent Ribot confesses himself.
In contrast to the "organic" psychology of the
English, which, resting on the general hypothesis of
evolution, explains the psychical phenomena as the
highest form of existence and as the most complicated
of all natural processes, because in point of time the
last, the German psychology has always set itself a
different problem. The psychology of Germany has
adopted the analytical method, and has borrowed its
points of view, as well as its technical forms, from the
phj'sical sciences. It exhibits generally a greater en-
deavor after precision ; especially the employment of
experiment ; the quantitative determination of facts
(experiment demanding numbers and measures) ; a
more restricted field of research ; a preference for
monographs instead of large compendious treatises.
This distinction of German and English psychology,
which at first glance seems strange, is, as we see, per-
fectly well-founded in the nature of things. As in art
and in public life, so the national character is ex-
pressed not less distinctly in science.
In the period of time between the publication of
the works on English and German psychology (1870-
1879) two larger treatises appeared bearing the titles
"Psychological Heredity" and "The Philosophy of
Schopenhauer," which are of great importance for an
understanding of Ribot's development.
The first is the only sacrifice which Ribot made to
his speculative tendencies. The second is a complete
liberation from them.
Heredity—habit—conservation of force : these are
the three apparently unrelated phenomena between
which Ribot in the conclusion of his work on heredity
endeavors to construct a bridge. " Considered from
" a philosophical point of view heredity appears to us
"as a fragment of a much higher and more general
"law, of a law of the universe, and its cause should
"be sought in the mechanism of the universe. Any-
" thing that has been, must always be ; hence, in the
"individual, habit and memory, and in the race, he-
" redity. It is simply a case of that ultimate law which
" phj'sicists call the conservation of energy, and meta-
" physicians universal causality. " We must see that
the idea here indicated is capable of a much more con-
crete expression, and it receives such in fact later from
Ribot's own hands. In the form in which it is here
expressed the principle is nothing but a pure specula-
tive hypothesis and bears on its face all the marks
which Ribot gives as characteristic of such : it is defi-
nite, it is clear, circumscribed, distinct, and—unde-
monstrable.
Undemonstrable ! This is the word which after a
detailed exposition of Schopenhauer's philosophy he
utters as his final criticism of it. And how any one in
seriousness or in conviction could believe and defend
things which are undemonstrable appears to him in
the course of his development more and more unin-
telligible. From now on, metaphysics is to him a kind
of belief in a second scientific revelation ; its history,
the history of error.
In 1 88 1 Ribot began his series of epoch-making
works on the pathology of psychic phenomena with
the "Diseases of Memory." These works, despite
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their medical titles, are of an entirely theoretical char-
acter. The attempt is made in them, in opposition to
the customary views on this subject, to found the doc-
trine of the normal functions on the consideration of
their pathological excesses, to view the phenomena of
psychical disease as undeveloped and therefore less
complicated forms of mental activity.
To the old psychology, memory is a special faculty
of the soul, a most remarkable and totally mysterious
mental capacity of preserving, reproducing, and ar-
ranging, perspectively in the past, images and ideas.
As Ribot had alread}' suggested in his treatise on he-
redity, and as it was later more minutely developed
by Professor Hering in his brilliant address on " Mem-
ory as a General Function of Organised Matter, " * true
psychical memory is at bottom only a special case of
a much more general phenomenon of " organic " mem-
ory, as it is met with in habit, in heredit}', and in the
instinct of newborn animals. This organic memory
is a property of every living cell. Its especial modi-
fication, as psychic memory, is exclusively the prop-
erty of the cerebral cell.
The chief merit of Ribot's work on memory is in
our judgment this, that it has brought order into the
numberless and complicated facts of the psycho-path-
ological literature belonging in this field, in such a
manner that only things of importance are emphasised,
yet everything that can throw light on the normal
mechanism of memory is thoroughly exhausted in the
concise space of one hundred and sixty octavo pages.
The results at which Ribot arrived at the conclusion
of his researches are by no means self-evident truisms,
but are apparently even paradoxical—veritable Colum-
bus eggs in science. One example will be enough to
support this assertion. It is that of the so-called "law
of regression " which Ribot formulated to express the
course of the disturbances of memory :
" In cases of general dissolution the loss of memories follows
an invariable order : recent facts, then ideas in general, then emo-
tions, then acts.
" In cases of partial dissolution, (in the case best known, the
forgetting of signs.) the loss of memories follows an invariable
order ; proper names, common names, adjectives and verbs, inter-
jections, gestures.
"In the two cases the order is identical. It is a regression
from the most recent to the oldest, from the comple.\ to the simple,
from the voluntary to the automatic, from the less organised to
the better organised.
"We have brought our law into connection with this physio-
logical principle, ' Degeneration first strikes that which has been
last formed,' and with this psychological principle, 'The complex
disappears before the simple, because it has been less often re-
peated in experience.' "
We here see a number of facts, which by them-
selves are highly remarkable, brought together in a
* A translation of this memoir was published in Vol. I of The Open Court,
Nos. 6 and 7, pp. 141 and 169.
law which is almost self-evident, reduced, so to say,
to a common denominator— a model of apposite ex-
planation.
Whilst in his work on " Memory," Ribot could re-
tain and employ points of view which are generally
familiar, he is, in his "Diseases of the Will" and his
"Diseases of Personality-," on much more unstable
ground. Although we speak dail}' of acts of will and
of individual consciousness, it would 3'et be almost
impossible to give anything like a description of these
phenomena, such as any one could easily give for facts
of memory. In both cases it is difficult—indeed, almost
impossible—to decide whether we are concerned with
elementary and especial contents of consciousness, or
with a secondar}' or derived phenomenon ; in both
cases, in fact, even Ribot's researches have led to a
substantially negative result.
In the mind of the natural inquirer there can be no
doubt that the processes which take place in the ner-
vous system like all other known phenomena of the
universe, are subject to the law of the conservation of
energy, that they form an uninterrupted non-displace-
able series whose last member is determined by the
first. The external stimuli which strike our senses are
propagated as internal products in our brains, they
proceed as centrifugal impulses to the motory nerves,
and are discharged outwardly in the form of motions
which are infinitely varied. By this mechanical ex-
planation we must abide, for as yet it is the only one
which renders a fraction of the phenomena of the
world, though not all, intelligible. It is our only anchor
of hope in this apparently lawless chaos of things.
And agreeably to the words of the immortal author of
the " Mecanique celeste" there can exist in the law-
fulness of natural phenomena no contradiction, except
such as our ignorance imports into it.
These in outline are the assumptions from which
Ribot proceeds in his observation of the phenomena
of will, and which he seeks to carry out, step by step,
in his work. He shows that in every act of the will
there are two factors which can be well distinguished :
the state of consciousness, the "I will," which es-
tablishes the situation, but in itself is wholly power-
less : and a highly complicated psycho-physiological
mechanism which sets free motory and inhibitory im-
pulses. He shows us that in pathological cases now
this and now that factor can be lost, that in the first
instance the irresistible fixed ideas, and in the second,
the disease aboulia arises. And he closes his exposi-
tion with this sentence : -'La volontc n' est pas la cause
de sien."
It is not to be denied that this conception of psy-
chological states as mere epiphenomena of certain
cerebral processes is of great service to the economy
of science, but it can also not be denied that the "dou-
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ble nervous process" is as 3'et simply an unproved
hypothesis. The attempt has been made in two ways
to get beyond this ; first, by the return to the old as-
sumption of a will, which has the power to act on the
psychical machine ; and second, in the recent books
of Janet and Binet, " L'automatisme psychologique "
and " Les alterations de la personnalit6, " and also in
the works of others, by the theory of the so-called
"double ego." Not only certain nervous processes,
but all such, are accompanied on this hypothesis by
consciousness, by a consciousness which is distributed,
as it were, in strata among different egos. We merely
mention this theory, as we do not see in it any sub-
stantial promotion of our knowledge.
In closing this description of Ribot's life-work, we
must not forget to mention a short treatise on the
" Psychology of- Attention," * which explains attention
as a purely motor activity, and, last but not least, we
must mention his long editorship of the Rcviic philo-
sophiquc. At present he is engaged, as he informs
the author of this article, in writing a new book, which
is to be called "La psychologic de sentiments."
If we glance again over Th. Ribot's scientific ca-
reer, we cannot refrain from yielding to it our sincere
admiration. We see in him one of the most ingenious
and most brilliant path-finders in one of the most diffi-
cult provinces of modern science.
THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE, A CATECHISM.
MYTHOLOGY AND RELIGION.
What is the attitude of the religion of science to-
wards other religions ?
The religion of science is not hostile to the spirit
of the traditional religions : on the contrary, being their
matured product, it regards them as harbingers that
prepare the way.
The dogmatic religions are mythologies which at-
tempt to teach the truth in parable and allegory. They
are prophecies of the religion of truth.
Is mythology injurious?
Mythology in itself is not injurious ; on the con-
trary, it is a necessary stage in the evolution not only
of religion, but also of science. Man's mode of con-
veying thought is essentially mythological. All lan-
guage is based upon similes and we shall perhaps never
be able to speak without using figures of speech.
The religion of science does not come to destroy
the mythologies of old religion ; it does not come to
destroy but to fulfil.
What is the nature of the mythology of science ?
Science no less than religion had to pass and, in
many of its fields, is still passing, through a mytholog-
* The authorised English translation of this work and of The Diseases of
Personality are published by The Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago. III.
ical period ; and this mythological period is often
marked by fantastic notions and extravagant vagaries.
Astrology preceded astronomy, and alchemy preceded
chemistry.
It is a great mistake of the chemist to look down
upon the alchemist, and of the astronomer to speak
with contempt of the astrologer of former ages. It is
a sign either of narrowness or of a lack of information
to revile our ancestors because they knew less than we.
Baron Liebig was the greatest chemist of his times
;
yet he speaks with profound respect of the aspirations
and accomplishments of the alchemists. Those upon
whose shoulders we stand deserve our thanks not our
contempt. Let us not despise the anthropoid from
whose labors man has risen to the height of a human
existence !
The mythology of science still clings to us to-day.
When does mythology become injurious?
Mythology becomes injurious as soon as it is taken
as the truth itself.
Mythology thus produces that self sufficient spirit
of dogmatism which prevents further inquiry into truth.
What is the origin of the mythological religions ?
The historical religions were founded at a time when
science and its methods of inquiry did not as yet exist.
Yet religion was wanted. People cannot live without
spiritual support and solace and guidance. And as the
old Egyptians instinctively discovered such tools as
the lever and other simple instruments helpful to them
in their work long before they understood the princi-
ples of these contrivances ; as mankind in general in-
stinctively invented language as a means of communi-
cation without having any philological knowledge, and
even without the least inkling of the laws of grammar
and logic : so some prophets rose among our ancestors
preaching to them some simple rules of conduct which
they had instinctively found when pondering on the
miseries caused by criminal and ruthless behavior.
The nobler conduct, preached by prophets and en-
forced by the evil consequences of sin, raised man-
kind to a higher ground. Men learned to feel and
appreciate the truth of the religious authority which
proclaims the moral commands ; and the religious
convictions thus established proved even in their im-
perfect form an invaluable source of solace and help
in the tribulations of life.
Does the law of evolution apply to religion also?
Religion develops according to natural laws. Not
only the human body and all living creatures, but also
such intangible and spiritual entities as science, law,
language, and social institutions are products of evo-
lution, and religion forms no exception.
THE OPEN COURT. 5659
The hypotheses of science are often formulated
with the help of analogies, and these analogies contain
figurative expressions. We speak for instance of elec-
tric currents, as if electricity were a fluid. This method
of using analogies which is of great service in scientific
investigations must not be taken as real science : it is
the mythology of science.
The mythology of science is no less indispensable
in the realm of investigation than it is in the province
of religion ; but we must not forget that it is a means
only to an end, the ideal of scientific inquiry being and
remaining a simple statement of facts.
While we may be able to free ourselves from the
shackels of mythology in science and philosophy, must
we, perhaps, still retain them in religion ?
The progress of religion in this direction will be the
same as in science and philosophy.
Progress of science means the formation of new
ideas, and the purification of our old ideas. The myth-
ological elements must be separated from the pure
statement of facts, the latter being the grain, the for-
mer the chaff ; the latter are the truth, the former our
mythologies, being the methods of reaching the truth.
The chaff is the husks, and grain cannot grow with-
out the wholesome protection of the husks. The truth
contained in mythological allegories is their all-im-
portant element, which has to be sifted out and pre-
served. The rest is to be discarded ; it has served an
educational purpose and will have to be relegated to
the history of science.
Religious progress, no less than scientific progress,
is a process of growth, it is an increment of truth, and
also a cleansing from mythology.
Religion is a world-conception regulating man's
conduct. Our world-conception grows with every new
information, and all those new ideas from which we
derive moral rules of conduct become religious ideas.
As science began with the crude notions of primi-
tive animism, so did religion begin with a mythology
full of superstition. And the ideal of religion is the
same as that of science, it is an increase of truth as
well as a liberation from mythological elements. The
more complete our knowledge is, the less is our need
of hypotheses, and mythological expressions can be
replaced by exact statements of fact. Both science and
religion are to be based upon a concise but exhaustive
statement of facts, which is to be constantly enlarged
by a more complete and more accurate experience.
The ultimate goal of religious development is the
recognition of the truth with the aspiration to live in
conformity to the truth.
Mythology which is conceived to be the truth itself
is called paganism.
Paganism is the notion that the parable is the mean-
ing it involves, that the letter is the spirit, that myth-
ology is the truth.
It is certainly no error to believe that virtue, jus-
tice, beauty, love, and other ideas have a real and true
existence in reality. They whose spiritual eyes are
too dim to see and to understand their being, will be
greatly benefited by the representations of the artist
and the poet, who present those ideals to us, the former
in our imagination, the latter visibly in marble as per-
sonal beings, as gods. There is no wrong in similes,
there is no fault to be found with parables. But he
who believes that these gods are personal beings, he
who takes the mythology to be the actual truth, is
under the spell of a gross misconception, and this mis-
conception is paganism.
Paganism leads to idolatry. He who worships the
symbol is an idolater.
The dogmatic religions of to-day are still under the
spell of paganism ; and even Christianity, the highest,
the noblest, and most humane of all religions, is not
yet free of idolatry,—a fact which appears in many
various customs and ceremonies. Sacrifices have been
abandoned, but prayer, adoration, and other institu-
tions still indicate the pagan notion that God is like a
human being, that he takes delight in receiving honors,
and that upon special considerations he will change
his decrees and reverse the order of nature for the sake
of those whom he loves.
The religion of science does away with paganism
and idolatry.
The religion of science rejects the religion of adora-
tion, and prescribes only one kind of worship—the
worship in spirit and in truth which consists in obeying
the authority of moral conduct.
The religion of science rejects all the vain repeti-
tions of such prayers as attempt to change not our will
but the will of God. Those prayers only are admitted
by the religion of science which set our souls in har-
mony with the authority of conduct, which consists in
self-discipline and teach us to say with jesus of Naza-
reth " Not our, but Thy will be done ! "
What are the sources of religious truth?
The religion of science knows of no special revela-
tions ; it recognises only the revelation of truth, open
to all of us; as it appears in our experience, viz., in
the events of nature surrounding us, and also in the
emotions of our own heart.
Religion is not due to a supernatural revelation,
but to the same natural revelation to which science
owes its existence.
The form of the established religions is mytholog-
ical, for its founders spoke in parables, and the alle-
gorical form of their teachings was quite adapted to
the age in which they lived.
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New problems have arisen with the growth of sci-
ence. The mytholog}' of our religions has become
palpably untenable, and we are no longer satisfied with
the dogmas extracted from parables.
Is there any conflict between religion and science?
True science and true religion can never come in
conflict. If there is any conflict between religion and
science, it is a sign that there is something wrong in
either our science or our religion, and we shall do well
to revise them both.
This is the conflict that at present obtains between
science and religion. The infidel laughs at the im-
postures of religion, while the bigot demands an im-
plicit surrender of reason.
The infidel as well as the bigot are under the er-
roneous impression that the mythology of religion is
religion itself.
What is to be done?
The bigot demands that science be muzzled, and
the infidel proposes to eradicate religion.
Shall we follow the bigot who wants the errors of
paganism to continue ? Or shall we follow the infidel ?
Shall we root out science, because it is not as yet free
from mythology? Shall we eradicate mankind because
there are traces of barbarism left in our institutions,
even to-day? Shall we abandon religion because it
still retains some of the superstitious notions of pa-
ganism ?
We follow neither the bigot nor the infidel, but
propose confidently to advance on the road of pro-
gress. It is the course prescribed by nature, which
willingly or unwillingly we shall have to pursue.
The ideal towards which every religious evolution
tends, is to develop a Religion of Truth. And this ideal
can be reached only through an honest search for the
truth with the assistance of the scientific methods of
inquiry.
Christianity possesses an ideal which is called " the
invisible church." Even the most devout Christians
are aware of the fact that the present condition of the
church is not the realisation of its ideal. The ideal of
the invisible church can find its realisation only in the
religion of science.
A SOCIALISTIC SCHEME.
BY MORRISON I. SWIFT.
The first day of May, 1900, should be fixed upon as the time
for changing the present industrial system. Affairs between Capi-
tal and Labor are rushing rapidly to a destructive crisis, and some
definite rational policy must be quickly decided upon, towards
which all scattered and otherwise dangerous energies can be
massed.
This policy is for the working classes to determine that on
the first of May, 1900, all owning managers of industry shall be
changed into managing partners with the workers, the workers be-
coming joint owners with the managers, and the managers becom-
ing merely their representatives.
There are seven years in which to prepare for this change.
The owners and managers should be invited to meet with the
workers to organise the details of the new system. Many would
immediately and gladly respond, and these, in conference with the
working people, would frame plans to which other managers
wauld consent upon understanding them. The best of the man-
agers would not wait until the year 1900 before establishing the
partnership, and when the movement began, many would be con-
verted to it, whom paper plans could not convince. In less than
seven years more than half the industries of the country might be
partnership industries.
Only one thing is necessary for this result : the working peo-
ple must firmly resolve, that after April, 1900, they will not work
under the present organisation of industry. If they are by that
time united in this purpose, those selfish capitalists who have not
voluntarily accepted the partnership plan, will be constrained to
yield. If they cannot get men to work for them their plants will
spoil.
The first step to this end is to form a society embracing as
many citizens, men and women, of this country, as wish to see the
inevitable industrial revolution accomplished peaceably. Every
working man and woman will be of this number. They wish their
fair share of the product of their industry, they also wish to ob-
tain it without the shedding of blood. They will therefore join in
the support of this peaceful method. All intelligent people of
every class will join it, for they are coming to see that society must
be reorganised from its base to satisfy the modern sense of justice
or even to survive.
Society must be saved from chaos by a strong, sufficient effort.
Therefore, let meetings be held to organise this movement ; let
societies be everywhere founded with this clear aim in view, to
make the working people partners in all industries in the year
1900.
Other and further developments of the industrial revolution
can be accomplished afterwards or at the same time. This will be
a tangible beginning, broad enough not only for all progressive
forces thus far organised to unite upon, but broad enough for those
unorganised up to this time; sufficiently evolutionary and suffi-
ciently revolutionary for the next seven years. While working for
their own specific ends as before, all reformers can cooperate for
this common end.
This plan has little machinery. Social leaders can establish
societies where they are, over the whole country, and these can
afterwards be federated with some central direction.
To hold the object clearly in mind is all that is necessary for
this organisation. But as many circumstances are driving labor
to frenzy, the time for immediate and universal action has come.
REMARKS BY GENERAL TRUMBULL.
I HAVE had the privilege of reading in manuscript the plan of
Mr. Swift, in order that I might make a few comments on its mer-
its and its defects as a scheme of social change.
The policy advocated by Mr. Swift is not new. More than
fifty years ago it was adopted by the English Chartists assembled
in their National Convention. They solemnly resolved to reverse
the social order by paralysing business for thirty days ; and this
thirty days was beatified as the " Sacred Month." On the first day
of the " Sacred Month " all work of every kind was to cease, and
it was confidently proclaimed that before the end of it the revolu-
tion would be accomplished, " without the shedding of blood."
The impossibility of the scheme became apparent as soon as
the Chartists attempted to fix a day for the beginning of the " Sa-
cred Month," They never could agree upon a day, and for want
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of such agreement the "Sacred Month" was perpetually post-
poned. The plan, long ago abandoned in England is now revived
in America, and the beginning of the ' ' Sacred Month " is definitely
appointed for the first day of May, igoo.
It is very easy for the working classes to determine that on the
first of May, 1900, "all owning managers of industry shall be
changed into managing partners with the workers, the workers be-
coming joint owners with the managers," but suppose the "own-
ing managers" determine otherwise, what then? In that case,
"the working people must resolve that after April, 1900, they will
not work under the present organisation of industry." Thus the
scheme degenerates into a mere strike. This amounts to a resolu-
tion that the workingmen will not eat after April, igoo. We might
as well resolve that after the first of May there shall be no more
rain.
There are two obstacles in the way of the plan ; the "owning
managers" would not agree to it, neither would the workingmen.
The workingmen prefer a specific sum as wages to any cooperative
scheme that involves a risk of loss. They have no confidence in
their own skill to manage a great industry, and they believe that a
thousand of them owning and operating a factory would never
agree among themselves either as to the hours of labor or as to a
division of profits, and especially as to an apportionment of losses.
Much has been written about the " profit sharing " policy but
nothing about the " loss sharing " plan, yet this latter is the more
important because the fear of loss is the chief obstacle to coopera-
tive industry. The laborers in a great factory would not accept it
as a gift on the basis of profit and loss and the surrender of wages.
They will accept a plant on the "profit sharing" plan, but if they
are to take the risk of losses also, they will prefer the certainty of
wages.
None of the parties to be reconciled by it would be satisfied
with it, and we must wait for its realisation until the world is peo-
pled with wiser and better men.
Mr. Swift's reform applies only to the finished product, such
as a New England cotton factory. This being already built and
furnished with water-power and machinery, the operatives may
just as well "determine" to have it for themselves as not, but the
scheme has no application to a prospective industry, such, for in-
stance, as the building of a new railroad, or, for the matter of that,
the building and equipping of a new cotton factory, or a ship.
Here is a grave difficulty, which I commend to the studious con-
sideration of Mr. Swift.
Besides, the communism of property must precede the com-
munism of industry, for what use is it that laborers work in com-
mon unless they own the land, the buildings, and all the raw ma-
terials of production ? Here is an obstacle in the way of Mr. Swift
;
an impediment that cannot be removed in seven years nor in sev-
enty. More men are property owners in the United States than
in any other country in the world, and for that reason the right of
private property has become a sentiment firmly established in the
American mind. That sentiment will weaken, of course, as prop-
erty, and especially land, becomes monopolised by a few, but it
will not be extinguished in our generation, and perhaps never.
If the change is desirable let us adopt it at once. Why should
the working-classes wait until the year igoo before becoming
"joint owners " of the mills and factories, the ships and shops, the
railroads and the farms ? If I have any share in any social reform
why should I be deprived of it for seven years ? If I am by right
a partner in any of the profitable industries of Chicago I want my
dividends now.
I am personally interested in the theory of Mr. Swift, be-
cause according to that theory I am now, and have been for many
years, a stockholder in a great railroad running from Montreal
into the New England States. I was one of its original builders.
I worked for many weeks with a wheelbarrow, pick, and shovel.
to make the roadbed on which the cars now run, and I shall be
very glad it the engineers, and firemen, and brakemen, and switch-
men, and conductors, and clerks "determine" to become joint
owners of the road, provided that I am admitted into the partner-
ship as one of its original builders. And will they kindly pay me
the back dividends long due ? Surely the men who build a plant
are as much entitled to a share of it as the men who work inside
of it after it is done.
Here is another difficulty. What share in the new industrial
system is to go to bricklayers, carpenters, painters, hod-carriers,
railroad laborers, builders of ships, and the multitudes of con-
structive workers who cannot become joint owners with the ' ' own-
ing managers," because there is nothing for them to own ? And
one question more : When the operatives have made themselves
joint owners of a cotton factory, or any other factory, will they
give work to laborers out of a job, or will they make the factory a
monopoly of their own ?
As a mere ideal aspiration the general plan appears to be
beneficent, because it calls for better conditions of the laboring
men ; but the scheme is impossible.
"I can call spirits from the vasty deep," said Owen Glen-
dower, "Why, so can I," said Hotspur; "or so can any man.
But will they come when you do call for them ? " Experience
teaches us that they will not ; neither will revolutions. The decla-
ration that a new social order shall begin on a certain day is like
the imperious command that King Canute gave to the sea. We
can just as effectively appoint a certain day for a cyclone.
A new social order means a new society, and where is the
promise that the American people will do in the year 1900 what
they refuse to do now ? Not on any particular day can we reverse
the social conditions evolved through the travail of ten thousand
years. As well might the apple-trees determine to bear nothing
but oranges on and after the first of May, igoo. The promise of
a man that seven years hence he will begin to be somebody else is
ridiculous, but not more so than the promise of society to change
its character on some future First of May.
THE NEW LAUREATE.
BY LOUIS EELROSE, JR.
Zounds, what a glorious chance to poetize I
Not one has missed it, every soul has bowed
And cut his little caper to the crowd.
And now they wait to see who'll get the prize.
Why waits the Judge ? Would not the time suffice
Wherein to write one name, long called aloud
By all the birds of spring, one name avowed
Where'er the sea salutes the approving skies ?
An heir remaining, does the law bequeath
Upon condition that his years have run
With only praise on all the winds that breathe ?
You seek a star beside the noonday sun ;
Laurel in hand, you ask which brow to wreathe
;
Great ears of Midas, man, there is but one
!
NOTES.
We present in this issue of The Open Court an article by Ed-
ward Sokal, translated from the German, on " Th. Ribot and
Modern Psychology."
It is certainly a good sign of the times that Ribot finds such
an enthusiastic apostle of his psychological views in the country
of critics, and I expect that Mr. Sokal's lucid exposition will con-
tribute much towards making the new conception popular. But I
cannot refrain from noticing that, in our opinion, Mr. Sokal is
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mistaken when he,says that according to Ribot the psychological
states which are "mere epi-phf-nomena of certain cerebral pro-
cesses," have to be regarded as a "double nervous process." Mr.
Sokal adds, " It cannot be doubted that the double nervous process
" is as yet an unproved hypothesis."
We do not recollect any passage in Ribot's works in which he
speaks of a "double nervous process." He speaks of " !a theorie
qui considers la ronscience comnu un simple phcnoiiiciit." His concep-
tion of psychological states as phenomenal or epi-phenomenal,
means that consciousness is a superadded element which, according
to conditions, may or may not be connected with the act. The
motor-nerves act whenever irritated by a proper stimulant. This
action is conscious if the conditions are present, and unconscious
if they are absent. It is not known to us that Ribot calls the
physiology of these conditions a double nervous process.
A man who is under the influence of some intoxicant may walk
about and act in the same way as one in full possession of his con-
sciousness. The conditions of consciousness are disturbed. On
the other hand, the state of consciousness which accompanies the
action is in itself of no efficacy. The normal condition of a man
is such that when he says "I will do this," his muscles obey the
order, but if the action of his nervous system is impaired by the
disease known as aboulia he may again and again pronounce the
words "I will do it" without being able to execute the motions.
The psychical condition in which a man feels the impulse of willing
and pronounces the words " I will " is one thing while the execu-
tion of motions is another. %
This is not an hypothesis but such are the facts.
The idea that psychical states are to be considered as epi phe-
nomenal is not a proposition which is original with M. Ribot. It
is, so it appears to us, an important and fundamental part of his
psychical views, but it is not a peculiarity of his theories. Spinoza
was, perhaps, the first to point out that we know two attributes of
existence which he calls extension and thought. Later philoso-
phers (Leibnitz), and in recent times, Clifford, Lewes, Huxley, Ro-
manes, and others have again and again called attention to the
fact that feelings are not motions and motions not feelings. Feel-
ings are not, and cannot be changed into, motions. Feelings may
be another aspect of motion. What I feel as a feeling may appear
to a physiologist, supposing that he could look into my brain, as a
nervous motion. But certainly feelings cannot be regarded as
somehow interrupting the mechanical action of the brain. The
mechanism of the brain is mechanical throughout, and if we could
look into a brain we would see no feelings but only brain-motions.
We grant that the term epi-phenomenal as a signification of
the realm of feelings is not very commendable, because it suggests
the idea that feelings are a mere redundant by-play of nerve-actions,
and this idea is wrong. Yet Ribot has been careful to forestall
such misapprehension of the term. He says in his "Diseases of
Personality" (English translation by The Open Court Publishing
Co., p. 14 et seqq.):
"There is one weak point in the hypothesis of consciousness as a [mere]
phenomenon. Its most convinced partisans have defended it in a form that
has caused them to be called the theorists of pure automatism. According to
their favorite comparison, consciousness is like the sparks from a steam-engine,
lighting it up at intervals, but having no effect upon its speed. Consciousness,
thus, does not produce action any more than the shadow that accompanies the
steps of the traveler. We have no objection to these metaphors, viewed purely
as vivid illustrations of the doctrine in question; but taken in a strict sense
they are exaggerated and inexact. Consciousness in itself and through itself
is really a new factor, and in this there is nothing either mystical or supernat-
ural.
"Volition is always a state of consciousness—the affirmation that a thing
must either be done or prevented ; it is the final and clear result of a great
number of conscious, sub-conscious, and unconscious states ; hut once af-
firmed, it becomes a new factor in the life of the individual, and, in the assumed
position, it marks a series, i. e. the possibility of being recommenced (begun
over again), modified, prevented. Nothing similar exists in regard to auto-
matic acts that are not accompanied by consciousness. Novelists and poets.
who usually are good observers of human nature, have frequently described
that well-known situation, in which a passion—whether love or hatred—long
brooded over, unconscious, ignorant of itself, at last bursting forth, recognises,
affirms itself, becomes conscious. Then its character changes; it either re-
doubles in intensity or is crossed by antagonistic motives. Here, likewise,
consciousness is a new factor, which has modified the psychological situation.
One may by instinct, that is. through unconscious cerebration, solve a prob-
lem, but it is very possible that some other day, at another moment, one will
fail in regard to an analogous problem. If. on the contrary, the solution of
any problem is attained through conscious reasoning, a failure will scarcely
occur in a second instance ; because every step in advance marks a gained
position, and from that moment we no longer grope our way blindly. This,
however, does not in the least diminish the part played by unconscious work
in all human discoveries.
"These examples taken at hazard may suffice to show, that the above-
mentioned metaphors are true of each state of consciousness taken in itself.
In itself, indeed, it is but a light without efficacy, merely the simple relation
of an unconscious work ; but in relation to the future development of the in-
dividual it is a factor of the first order. . . . Consciousness itself is hut a phe-
nomenon, only an accompaniment. . . . But if the state of consciousness leaves
a vestige, a registration in the organism, in such case it does not act merely
as an indicator, but as condenser. The metaphor of an automaton is no longer
acceptable. This being admitted, many objections to the theory of a con-
sciousness-phenomenon fall to the ground of themselves. The theory is com-
pleted, without having been weakened."
The office of The Open Court has been moved from the Nixon
Building on La Salle street to " The Monon," 320-326 Dearborn
street.
Macmillan & Co. have just published a pretty little volume by
F. Marion Crawford, entitled "The Novel: What It Is." One
can find in this little book a great many suggestions, which to the
mind that has never thought on these subjects will be very helpful.
Mr. Crawford presents some excellent arguments, from the literary
point of view, against the didactic novel, or Teiuienzromati. He
discloses the mistakes of the ultra-realistic school, and pleads the
cause of the " eternally human " idea : the novel must be the ex-
pression of real phases of the human heart, and ethical rather
than aesthetic. A picture of Mr. Crawford precedes the book.
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